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ToRTS - CHILD's RIGHT To Rscov:ER FOR ALIENATION OF PARBNT's AFFECTION-Plaintiff's parents were divorced in 1934 when plaintiff was :five
years old. Custody of plaintiff was awarded to her mother, but plaintiff alleged
that she received "usual paternal love, affection, maintenance, and support"
from her father until 1941, when plaintiff's father took defendant as his mistress,
keeping her until his death in 1952. Plaintiff brought this action for damages
on the theory that defendant alienated the affections of her father, thereby
depriving plaintiff of fatherly affection, guidance and support. Defendant's
demurrer was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, held, reversed. In the
absence of a statute, a child has no cause of action against a third party for
the alienation of the affections of its parent. Scholberg v. Itnyre, (Wis. 1953)
58 N.W. (2d) 698.
Not until 1945 did any appellate court in the United States recognize that
a child has a legally protectable interest in the love, society and support of his
parent.1 Previously, at least three courts had denied such relief.2 Since then
courts in thirteen jurisdictions have passed on this question; four decisions in
three states have held that such a right exists,8 while ten jurisdictions have
rejected such a cause of action.4 Various reasons have been advanced by the

lDaily v. Parker, (7th Cir.) 152 F. (2d) 174 (1945). In the absence of controlling
Illinois law, the federal court felt free to decide the case as one of first impression. Extensive law review comment resulted. E.g., see 46 CoL. L. REv. 464 (1946); 59 HAnv. L.
lli!v. 297 (1945); 32 VA. L. REv. 420 (1946); 32 CoRN. L.Q. 432 (1947); 30 MINN. L.
REv. 310 (1946); 94 Umv. PA. L. REv. 437 (1946). See generally 12 AL.R. (2d)
1178 (1950).
2 Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 P. 400 (1923); Cole v. Cole, 277 Mass. 50,
177 N.E. 810 (1931); Morrow v. Yannantuona, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.S. 912 (1934),
8 Illinois: Daily v. Parker, note 1 supra; Johnson v. Luhman, 330 ill. App. 598, 71
N.E. (2d) 810 (1947); Minnesota: Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W. (2d) 543
(1949); Michigan: Russick v. Hicks, (D.C. Mich. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 281.
4 McMillan v. Taylor, 81 App. D.C. 322, 160 F. (2d) 221 (1946), followed in
Edler v. MacAlpine-Downie, 86 App. D.C. 97, 180 F. (2d) 385 (1950); Taylor v. Keefe,
134 Conn. 156, 56 A. (2d) 768 (1947); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. (2d) 454, 190
P. (2d) 984 (1948) (based on a statutory amendment); Garza v. Garza, (Tex. Civ. App.
1948) 209 S.W. (2d) 1012; Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E. (2d) 432 (1949);
Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E. (2d) 545 (1950); Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc.
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courts for denying relief to a child in this kind of case. It is said that there
is no loss of "consortium,''5 the basis of a suit for alienation of affections, 6 or
that such actions are either prohibited by or contrary to the spirit of so-called
''heart balm" statutes which abolish, inter alia, suits for alienation of affections. 7
Practical considerations, such as the prospect of fostering a multiplicity of
actions and creating new opportunities for extortion, the difficulty of assessing
dam.ages, and the fear of causing a Hood of litigation, are thought to stand in
the way of allowing such actions.8 Other courts have felt that the creation
of such new rights is a matter for the legislature.9 On the other hand, courts
awarding relief have emphasized the sociological change in the concept of the
family, resulting in relative equality for all members;10 the capacity of the
common law to adapt itself to changed circumstances and create new rights
by a process of "judicial empiricism";11 and the fact that so-called practical
difficulties should not deprive an injured plaintiff of a remedy.12 The most
serious objection to recognizing this cause of action would seem to be the
legislative policy abolishing such actions. A somewhat contrary policy, however, is evidenced by the strong tendency in the direction of liberalizing substantive and procedural rights of infants, e.g., permitting an unemancipated
child to sue his parent in tort for negligence,18 allowing an action by a child
against his parent for support,14 and recognizing a cause of action in a child
for pre-natal injuries.15 Moreover, the wisdom of the heart balm acts providing
for the complete abolition of alienation of affections suits has been seriously
questioned by many writers, who argue that they are in conflict with the policy
of the law to give i~creased protection to the sanctity of the home, and that

412, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 863 (1950) (based on statute); Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337,
98 N.E. (2d) 74 (1951); Kleinow v. Ameika, 19 N.J. Super. 165, 88 A. (2d) 31 (1952);
and the principal case.
5 A bundle of legal rights consisting of services, society, and sexual intercourse. Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1745). The modem law has added
a fourth element, conjugal affection. PROSSER, ToRTS 917 (1941). See Holbrook, "The
Change In The Meaning of Consortium," 22 MrcH. L. REv. 1 (1923).
6 Morrow v. Yannantuona, note 1 supra; Taylor v. Keefe, note 4 supra.
7 Taylor v. Keefe, note 4 supra; Katz v. Katz, note 4 supra. Contra, Russick v. Hicks,
note 3 supra. Recent comments on these statutes are found in 47 MrcH. L. REv. 383
(1949); 33 VA. L. REv. 314 (1947); 52 CoL. L. REv. 242 (1952).
8 83 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 276 (1934), accepted in Taylor v. Keefe, note 4 supra;
Nelson v. Richwagen, note 4 supra.
·
9 Gleitz v. Gleitz, note 4 supra; principal case.
10 Johnson v. Luhman, note 3 supra.
11 Daily v. Parker, note 1 supra.
12 Miller v. Monsen, note 3 supra.
18 Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. (2d) 642, 251 P. (2d) 149 (1952); Signs v. Signs, 156
Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. (2d) 743 (1952).
14 Parker v. Parker, 335 ID. App. 293, 81 N.E. (2d) 745 (1948); Simonds v. Simonds,
(D.C. Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 326.
15 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. (2d) 334
(1949); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. (2d) 691 (1951).
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they undoubtedly deny relief in many cases of serious and genuine wrong.16
The opportunity for extortion is present in many types of tort litigation, and it
is difficult to see how this justifies complete abolition of a cause of action. A
much better solution would seem to be the one found in an Illinois statute
passed after the Illinois heart balm act was held unconstitutional.17 This act
limits damages in any alienation of affections suit to actual damages, and prohibits punitive damages and relief based on mental anguish, leaving the punishment of the wrongdoer to the criminal laws.18 Such provisions afford relief
in genuine hardship cases, while at the same time avoiding the frequently
voiced criticis:QJ. that allowing punitive damages often leads to excessive verdicts.
It may be that the loss of the society of the type of parent who deserts his home
is de minimis damage-wise to a child. However, it does seem that an infant
should be permitted to recover for loss of support and maintenance, and where
a statutory action for support is unavailable or is inadequate for one reason or
another,19 compensatory damages ought to be awarded against the paramour
who is in effect a joint tortfeasor with the derelict parent. The required joinder
of ·all children who have a cause of action, and the permitted joinder of the
transgressing parent and the third party prompting the dereliction would be
desirable innovations. A new, definitive statutory solution is needed .in this
area.
Marvin 0. Young, S.Ed.

16 Feinsinger, "Legislative Attack on 'Heart Balm,' " 33 Mi:cH. L. R:Ev. 979 (1935);
Kane, "Heart Balm and Public Policy," 5 FoRDHAM L. R:Ev. 63 (1935); Pnoss1m, ToRTS
938 (1941); 30 h.L. L. fuv. 764 (1936),
11 Heck v. Schupp, 394 ill. 296, 68 N.E. (2d) 464 (1946).
18 ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 68, §34-40. Similar provisions appear as to actions for
criminal conversation, c. 68, §41-47, and as to breach of promise, c. 89, §25-34.
19 At common law an infant could not maintain a suit for support against his parent.
MADDEN, DoMEsTic RELATIONS 392 (1931). Cf. cases cited in note 14 supra. The courts
in Nelson v. Richwagen, note 4 supra, and Henson v. Thomas, note 4 supra, deemed
statutes authorizing actions for support significant in denying relief in an alienation of
affections action.

